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Abstract 
East Asia is an important area of “emerging economies” in the world 
because a large number of countries or regions have successfully achieved 
rapid economic growth over the past few decades. Nevertheless, since the 
end of 2000s, economists at international financial institutions such as the 
World Bank and Asian Development Bank (ADB) have cast their doubt on 
the “East Asian miracle”, and insisted that East Asian economies were 
going to experience the problem of middle-income trap where upper 
middle-income countries have suffered economic stagnation and have faced 
difficulties in shifting to high-income countries.  
A typical case is Malaysia, which moved into an upper 
middle-income category of country in 1991, but has failed in shifting to a 
high income-country for over twenty years. In 2012, ADB also pointed out 
that China would face the same problem of middle-income trap so far as she 
continued to depend on the low-cost advantage of the source of growth. ADB 
suggested China to switch its growth pattern from an input-driven one to an 
innovation-driven one to escape the possible trap in the near future. 
In this study the author picks up the three countries of China, 
Malaysia, and Thailand as case studies, and he aims to investigate the 
current situations of these countries in terms of wage level, labor 
productivity, and R&D activities (innovation). After confirming the 
situations of increasing wage-level and low-level innovation, he compares 
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the responses of the three countries to the middle-income trap in special 
reference to the role of government.  
At first, he selects China. He claims that China is requested to shift 
the sources of growth from over-investment and exports to domestic 
consumption, together with productivity improvement through innovation 
and industrial upgrading. In the case of Malaysia, he focuses on the 
increasing role of foreign workers in manufacturing sector (no significant 
contribution to productivity improvement), and compares the policy agenda 
between the National Development Plan (NDP: 1991-2010) and the New 
Economic Model (NEM: 2010-2020). He clarifies by illustrating that the 
policy targets of the NEM in Malaysia are similar to policy options 
suggested by ADB for China.  
Lastly, in the case of Thailand, he points out the big gap between the 
government policy targets (the promotion of new-age or next generation 
industries) and actual competitiveness of local big firms, mostly family 
businesses based on agro industries and service sectors rather than core 
manufacturing industries. Therefore, government policies responding to the 
middle-income trap are less effective if there is no full-scale collaboration 
from foreign firms. He finally suggests that Thailand is expected to seek a 
more independent way in which local Thai firms can demonstrate their own 
advantages on the basis of Thai-ness and hospitality.  
 
 
 
I. THE LIMIT TO THE INPUT-DRIVEN GROWTH PATH 
 
What is the ‘middle-income trap’? 
 
Starting around the end of the 2000s, a certain term was often used in 
discussions about emerging Asian countries. This was the ‘middle-income 
trap’, a favoured term of economists at international institutions and 
American think tanks.2 
2This literature includes the World Bank (Yusuf and Evenett 2002; Gill and Kharas 
2007), IMF (Aiyar, Duval, Puy, Wu, and Zhang 2013), Asian Development Bank (ADB 
2012a), the National Bureau of Economic Research (Eichengreen, Park, and Shin 
2013), and the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College (Felipe, Abdon, and Kumar 
2012).  
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For example, in Asia 2050 (ADB 2012a), the Asian Development Bank 
provided two long-term forecasts for Asia as a whole, giving an optimistic 
scenario (the Asian century) and a pessimistic scenario (the risk of getting 
caught in a middle-income trap). Kenichi Ohno (2009) tackled this issue 
from the perspective of a ‘development trap’ and industrial policy. 
The Asian Development Bank addressed this issue in relation to China 
in 2012 in Growing Beyond the Low-Cost Advantage: How the People’s 
Republic of China Can Avoid the Middle-Income Trap (ADB 2012b). They 
suggested the path China could take to upgrade from an 
upper-middle-income country to a high-income country through a 
combination of four elements: technically advanced domestic firms, 
high-value goods and services, developed markets, and innovation in 
products and processes (11). 
That same year, the World Bank raised the same issue in a report titled 
China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative High-Income 
Society (World Bank and Development Research Center of the State Council, 
People’s Republic of China 2012). They pointed out the difficulty involved 
for middle-income countries to shift to high-income countries. In fact, among 
101 middle-income countries or economies in 1960, only 13 countries or 
economies could reach the high-income level in 2008, namely Equatorial 
Guinea, Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Korea, Mauritius, 
Puerto Rico, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, and Taiwan. Four out of those 13 
(Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan) belong to the so-called Asian 
newly industrialized economies, or the Asian NIES (Suehiro 2008, chapter 
1). 
Research by World Bank economists Yusuf and Nabeshima (Yusuf and 
Nabeshima 2009) on Malaysia and studies by Kenichi Ohno (Ohno 2009), 
Tran Van Tho (Tran 2010), and Nguyen Cao Due (2015) on Vietnam is 
representative of their respective areas.3 Around 2011 in Thailand, the 
central bank and the National Economic and Social Development Board 
started to discuss this issue, warning that Thailand’s international 
competitiveness was declining. Following government economists, Japanese 
scholars have also turned their eyes to this issue since 2013, as we see in 
Egawa (2013), Oizumi (2016), and Suehiro (2017). 
3 For more empirical studies on Malaysia, please see Tham and Loke (2011) and 
Kumagaya (2014).  
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The term middle-income trap was first used by the World Bank’s Gill 
and Kharas in An East Asian Renaissance (Gill and Kharas 2007). They 
argued that three transformations were required for emerging Asian 
countries (middle-income countries) to continue their growth: (1) 
transformation from diversification to more specialization (based on 
economies of scale) in production and employment; (2) transformation from 
a focus on investment to a focus on innovation; and (3) a shift from 
equipping workers with skills that allow them to adjust to new technologies 
to prepare them to shape new products and processes. 
Gill and Kharas sounded a warning that economic growth in these 
countries would be sluggish without steady progress through these three 
transformations and that the emerging Asian countries would be caught in 
a middle-income trap, as is the current situation for many middle-income 
countries in the Middle East and Latin America (17–18). Likewise, 
Eichengreen et al. (2013) defined countries suffering the middle-income trap 
as those that had undergone average GDP growth of at least 3.5% for 
several years and subsequently stepped down by at least 2% between 
seven-year periods. Similar observations are shared by the IMF Group 
(Felipe et al. 2012; Veerayooth 2015, 56). 
In particular, the study of Felipe and others notably explored the issue 
of middle-income trap by employing two major criteria: the income range 
used to distinguish a middle-income country, and the average duration of 
stagnation in the same category of middle-income country on the basis of 
past experiences. They surveyed 124 countries or economies and categorized 
middle-income countries as those having GDP per capita of between $2,000 
and $11,759 in terms of 1990 PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) US dollars (a 
lower-middle-income country having less than $7,250 and an 
upper-middle-income country having more than $7,250). They calculated 
the average years of transition and discovered two facts: 28 years for the 
transition from a lower-middle-income to an upper-middle-income level and 
14 years from the latter to a high income level. 
As of 2010, 30 out of 38 lower-middle-income countries remained as such 
for more than 28 years. Five out of 14 upper middle-income countries stayed 
in the same income range for more than 14 years. If looking at Southeast 
Asian countries, we find that Malaysia is one of the five that may have 
fallen into the upper-middle-income trap, while Indonesia is in danger of 
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remaining in the lower-middle-income trap. 
The study of Felipe and others focuses on past economic performance in 
terms of per capita income. On the other hand, if we focus on the growth 
pattern of a country, we find that the middle-income trap closely connects 
with the path of trying to achieve economic growth through additional 
inputs of cheap labour and low-cost capital. In other words, it refers to the 
situation in which the low-cost advantages have been tapped out because of 
wage increases that exceed increases in productivity and a downward trend 
in investment efficiency (Suehiro 2014, chap. 6). 
A country’s growth rate will therefore decline unless improvements in 
labour quality (increased skills and technical know-how) and technological 
innovation can increase labour productivity. The country will hit the 
so-called wall of input-driven growth. The middle-income trap highlighted 
by international institutions has virtually the same meaning as this wall. 
 
Doubts about the theory of the middle-income trap 
 
This paper first considers the example of Malaysia, which is a typical 
country facing the middle-income trap (Table 1).4 Malaysia transitioned to 
what the World Bank defines as an upper-middle-income country in 1979. It 
subsequently dropped back down to lower-middle-income status, and, 
although it regained its status as an upper-middle-income country in 1991, 
it has so far been unable to join the group of high-income countries, as the 
study of Felipe and others has pointed out (Felipe, Abdon, and Kumar 
2012).  
Between 2010 and 2015, per capita GNI in Malaysia increased from 
US$9,069 to US$9,766, or by merely US$700, in contrast to the case of 
China, which impressively increased per capita GNI from US$4,516 to 
US$7,925 in the same period. Malaysia clearly remains at a standstill 
compared to Taiwan, which took 15 years to transition to a high-income 
country after becoming an upper-middle-income country in 1973, and South 
Korea, which took 16 years to transition to a high-income country after 
becoming an upper-middle-income country in 1978. 
4 Table 1 is constructed on the basis of nominal per capita GNI, not the real per capita 
GDP such as 1990 PPP dollars, according to the definition of the annual report of the 
World Bank (appendix in the World Bank Development Report).  
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This highlights how Malaysia has been caught in the middle-income 
trap. More precisely, Malaysia has hit the ‘wall for transitioning to a 
high-income country’ (Suehiro 2014, 127). By contrast, Thailand and China 
both joined the group of upper-middle-income countries in 2010. It is unfair 
to apply the middle-income trap theory used in relation to Malaysia to 
countries that have only just become upper-middle-income countries. 
Moreover, an issue confronting both of these countries, and an issue for 
Indonesia, which is on the verge of becoming an upper-middle-income 
country, is the clarification of what policies are required to transition into 
high-income countries. 
Lastly, India and Vietnam both finally escaped from the group of 
low-income countries in 2007 and 2008, respectively, so they cannot be 
discussed in the same terms as Thailand and China. This is because the 
issue that India and Vietnam face is clarifying what policies are needed for 
a future transition into an upper-middle-income country, not a high-income 
country. 
An interesting point in Table 1 is the trend of Latin American countries. 
　　　　Item
Country/
Economy 2015 2010 1990 High-Income
Upper-Middle-
Income
Lower-Middle-
Income
Singapore High-Income 52,889 46,570 11,864 1981 Before 1962 ・・・
Hong Kong High-Income 42,423 32,550 13,485 1978 Before 1962 ・・・
Japan High-Income 32,477 42,935 25,124 1967 Before 1962 ・・・
Korea, Republic High-Income 27,221 22,151 6,642 1993 1978 Before 1962
Taiwan High-Income 23,298 19,864 8,178 1988 1973 Before 1962
Malaysia Upper-Middle 9,766 9,069 2,417  　－ 1979-86, 1991 Before1962,1987-90
China Upper-Middle 7,925 4,516 316  　－ 2010 1998
Thailand Upper-Middle 5,816 5,112 1,508  　－ 2010 1966
Indonesia Lower-Middle 3,346 3,125 631  　－  　－ 1979
Philippines Lower-Middle 2,899 2,145 715  　－  　－ Before 1962
Vietnam Lower-Middle 2,111 1,334 98  　－  　－ 2008
Laos Lower-Middle 1,812 1,147 204  　－  　－ 2010
India Lower-Middle 1,582 1,388 375  　－  　－ 2007
Sources: Compiled by the author based on both World Development Reports  (various issues) and the World Development
Indicators 2016 Online (accessed 10 February 2017).
Notes: In 2014, World Bank defined high-income economies as economies with a GDP per capita of $12,736 or more;
upper-middle-income economies as those with a GDP per capita between $4,126 and $12,725; lower-middle-income
economies as those with a GDP per capita between $1,045 and $4,125; and low-income economies as those with a GDP per
capita of $1,045 or less (World Development Indicators 2016).
Table 1 Year of Shifting to High-Income or to Upper-Middle-Income Economy in Asian Economies
Grouping
The Year of Entering into a GroupPer Capita Nominal GDP ($)
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After having previously been a high-income country, Argentina dropped 
back down into the upper-middle-income country category in 1968. While 
Brazil and Mexico are both referred to as middle-income countries, they 
have fluctuated between being upper- and lower-middle-income countries. 
Except for Malaysia, such examples have not been evident in Asia. 
At any rate, it is clearly unreasonable for international institutions to 
group emerging Asian countries together as middle-income countries, even 
though their per capita income levels differ, and assert that they are all 
caught in a hidden trap. What instead need to be considered are the hidden 
problems in the growth patterns common to these countries; in other words, 
the problems of growth limitations grounded in the low-cost advantage. 
Rather than referring to this problem as the middle-income trap, this paper 
refers to it as the ‘limit to the input-driven growth path’. 
 
‘The Myth of Asia’s Miracle’ and ‘Innovative East Asia’ 
 
A similar argument to that of the middle-income trap was presented in ‘The 
Myth of Asia’s Miracle’ (Krugman 1994), a paper by Paul Krugman that 
aimed at criticizing The East Asian Miracle, published by the World Bank 
(1993). 
Krugman asserted that the previous high growth in East Asia was due 
to additional inputs of capital and labour, not technical innovation. He thus 
predicted that if wages in Asia rose and investment efficiency declined, 
Asian growth would eventually slow down and the ‘miracle age’ would end. 
Krugman’s prediction came true with the outbreak of the Asian 
currency crisis three years later, and his thesis became famous overnight. 
The currency crisis was ultimately attributed to a combination of such 
international factors as large, speculative movements of short-term 
international funds and such domestic factors as fragile financial systems 
and poor corporate governance (Suehiro 2008, chap. 4). It was not a 
consequence of the higher wages and lower investment efficiency purported 
by Krugman. 
Nevertheless, World Bank economists took the currency crisis as a 
turning point, considering all East Asian economic development after that 
time as ‘input-driven growth’ and emphasising its negative aspects. For 
example, Yusuf and Evenett asserted the following in Can East Asia 
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Compete? (Yusuf and Evenett 2002). 
 
Except for the low-income economies, innovation will be the 
engine of growth for much of East Asia now that the initial 
resource-intensive phase of industrialization is ending [meaning 
the end of the input-driven growth era]. Innovation in a broad 
range of areas, from products to services and business 
organizations, will be the principal source of increases in 
productivity and in export competitiveness. (3–4) 
 
Furthermore, they note the importance of tackling three areas: (1) 
creating an environment that stimulates research and development (R&D) 
by public and private entities which form the fundamentals of innovation; 
(2) integrating the manufacturing sector with the financial and services 
sectors; and (3) leveraging information and communications technology. In 
addition, regarding (1), Yusuf and Evenett discuss the importance of 
creating corporate clusters of networked firms based not on 
government-driven policies but on open competition. 
The arguments presented in these reports are virtually the same as the 
middle-income trap argument that became popular in the early 2010s 
(Aiyar et al. 2013; Eichengreen et al. 2013; Veerayooth 2015). The 
phenomenon had therefore been noted more than 10 years earlier. So why 
was there interest in the ‘limit to the input-driven growth path’ at this time? 
The following section considers this point from the aspects of wages and 
labour productivity. 
 
II. HIGHER WAGES AND LOWER LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY 
 
End of the low-cost advantage era 
 
The main reason that the Asian Development Bank and others discussed 
China from the perspective of the middle-income trap was the pronounced 
rise in nominal wages starting in the late 2000s (Figure 1). The main 
attribute of East Asia’s economic development is that its industrialisation is 
labour-intensive and focuses on export-oriented industries. Therefore, the 
ability to continually secure a high-quality labour force at comparatively 
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low wage levels is vital to sustaining industrialisation. 
On this point, China has a population of 1.3 billion, with enormous 
labour reserves living in its countryside, and it was even said back around 
the early 2000s that there was no limit to China’s labour supply. In fact, 
farmworkers who have moved from rural villages to the city (180 million 
people as of 2011) have supported the development of labour-intensive 
industries (Kan 2013). 
However, a labour shortage appeared in coastal cities’ industrial areas 
in the late 2000s, and both nominal and real wages started to rise. The 
concern about China’s economy in the mid-2000s, which focussed on 
‘whether or not China had already reached a Lewisian turning point’, 
reflected this phenomenon. For reference, a Lewisian turning point 
indicates a break point at which real wages start rising as excess labour 
from the farm sector (nonmodern sector) is absorbed by the modern sector in 
the cities. 
 
As illustrated in Figure 1, the rate of wage increase in China in the 
2000s exceeded 10% per annum. Moreover, in 2012, vice president Xi 
Jinping (who became the head of state the following year) suggested a policy 
that would condone wage increases of about 13% per year for the following 
Figure 1  Wage Level in Urban Workers in China, 1996-2014 (Yuen/Year)
Source: Compiled by the author based on information from IV. Employment and
Wages in China Statistical Yearbook 2015.
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four years to improve living standards and expand domestic demand, and 
after that there was no stopping higher wages in China.5 
While the degrees vary, sharp wage increases also occurred in Thailand 
and Vietnam. For example, in January 2013, the Thai government adopted 
a policy concerning the minimum wage, increasing it from a daily wage level 
of between 162 baht (regional provinces) and 215 baht (Bangkok and its 
surrounding five provinces) to a nationwide uniform figure of 300 baht 
(implemented in the capital area starting in April 2012). While this policy 
was intended to confirm that wage levels in the capital had already 
exceeded 300 baht, it also reflected the Thai government’s desire to shift to 
an industry structure oriented towards technology and knowledge-intensive 
industries by constraining the entry of foreign-owned companies that were 
looking for a low-wage labour force. 
Furthermore, Thailand had been confronted with a chronic labour 
shortage since 2000. Therefore, the government not only issued work 
permits to foreign workers from Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar (CLM) who 
had legally entered the country to work, but also gave temporary work 
permits to illegal immigrants from CLM on the basis of agreements with 
those countries. 
These foreign workers were employed in such wide-ranging occupations 
as fishing, transporting of paddy, harvesting of natural rubber and palm oil, 
and construction, as well as in menial jobs in various manufacturing sectors 
and housework. According to publicly released data (Ministry of Labour, 
Office of Foreign Workers Administration), as of 2011, Thailand had 580,000 
legal workers and 1.25 million illegal immigrants and people with 
temporary work permits, for a total of 1.83 million foreign workers, of whom 
more than 80% were from Myanmar (Takeguchi 2014). The large presence of 
foreign workers is highlighted by the fact that private-sector companies in 
Thailand employ about 11 million Thai people in manufacturing, 
construction, and service sectors. 
There has also been a pronounced increase in wages in Vietnam in 
recent years. According to the World Bank’s Vietnam Development Report 
2008 (World Bank 2007), the minimum wage was 290,000 dong per month 
5For literature referring to the interrelationship between the Chinese economy and the 
middle-income trap, please see Eichengreen, Park, and Shin 2011, ADB 2012b, 
Peerenboom (2014), Kan Ryu (2014), and Kato and Kajitani 2016. 
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in 2004, but at foreign-owned companies in ‘Area 1’, which includes Hanoi 
and Ho Chi Minh City, it was 487,000 per month (World Bank 2007, 43). 
Subsequently, the minimum wage in Area 1 has been raised almost every 
year, rising to 450,000 dong (810,000 dong for foreign-owned companies) in 
October 2006, then increasing to 1.35 million dong (1.55 million dong for 
foreign-owned companies) by January 2011. Minimum wages at Vietnamese 
and foreign-owned companies were then unified in October 2011 and raised 
to 2 million dong (US$100). The minimum wage has continued going up 
since then, reaching 2.35 million dong (US$112) in 2013, and 2.75 million 
dong (US$131) in 2014 (data from the Japan External Trade Organization’s 
Hanoi Office). 
Vietnam’s policy of rapid wage increases is not due to an overall 
workforce shortage, as is the case in China and Thailand. It should be seen 
as the result of two issues: the inherent problem for developing countries of 
not enough workers qualified for employment in modern factories, and the 
recent rise in the cost of living. 
 
Two indicators of labour productivity 
 
Increased labour productivity is vital if economic growth is to be maintained 
when wages are rising. Two metrics indicate increased labour productivity. 
One metric is growth of labour productivity, which is measured as the 
annual growth rate in the amount of production per capita (the amount of 
value added). The other is the differential in labour productivity, which is 
measured by taking the amount of added value produced per capita in the 
top developed country (the US) as 100 and looking at how much the same 
figure for a given country varies from the US figure. 
It is important to note that the annual growth rate in labour 
productivity has constantly been higher in Asia than in all other regions in 
the world, including developed countries. According to the results of an 
International Labour Organization (ILO) survey, the annual growth rate in 
labour productivity from 1990 to 2005 averaged 3.87% for Asia as a whole, 
and 3.33% for Asia excluding China. By contrast, labour productivity 
growth in Latin America was a very low 1.35%. In addition, the figure for 
Asia was about twice that of the US (1.80%) and Japan (1.41%) (McMillan 
and Rodrik 2011). 
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The issue to be raised here is not the annual growth rate of labour 
productivity over a certain time period, but rather the change in the annual 
growth rate over time. This is because the growth rate of labour 
productivity tends to fall when capital stock increases with progress in 
industrialisation. Figure 2 shows the data for each country over four time 
periods, using the Productivity Databook of the Asian Productivity 
Organization (APO 2015). 
 
 
 
As shown in the figure, all countries apart from China and India are 
trending downward in their annual growth rate of labour productivity. Even 
though China has fallen from 10.3% in the early 1990s, it showed a high 
annual growth rate of 9.0% on average from 2005 to 2014. On the other 
hand, Thailand has experienced a sharp decline, from 5.2% in 2000–2005 to 
3.2% in 2005–2014, while Malaysia also showed a similar decline, from 3.1% 
to 2.3%, in the same period. A downward trend can also be confirmed for 
South Korea (from 4.3% to 3.5%) and Singapore (from 3.7% to only 1.1%), 
which are high-income countries. 
Still, we cannot necessarily say that China does not have a problem with 
labour productivity. Taking the United States to be 100 and comparing the 
Source: Compiled by the author based on Asian Productivity Organization (2015: 65).
Figure 2  Per-Hour Labour Productivity Growth, Using 2011 PPP, 1990-2014  (%)
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amount of added value produced per worker indicates that China was only 7 
in 2000 and 19 even in 2014 (Figure 3). 
 
 
 
Singapore already caught up with the United States, at 115 in 2014, and 
even Japan was low at 66, reflecting the low productivity of its service sector. 
Furthermore, in 2014, Malaysia was 50, and Thailand was not only low at 
23 but should be looked at for the very moderate pace of improvement over 
the past 35 years, from 1980 to 2014. 
The OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development)’s theory of newly industrialising countries, or NICs (OECD 
1979), and the author’s book Catch-Up Industrialization (Suehiro 2008) 
refer to a catch-up index that illustrates the extent to which the per capita 
income differential between developed countries and emerging 
industrialised countries is contracting. However, prior to the 1980s, the 
catch-up index used by international institutions and economists was the 
differential in productivity with the United States at 100. The 
representative study on this issue is Abramovitz’s classic thesis ‘Catching 
Up, Forging Ahead, and Falling Behind’ (Abramovitz 1986). 
When using the differential in productivity, it is important to note the 
large gap with the United States that still exists even for a high-income 
country such as South Korea, not to mention emerging Asian countries. 
 Source: Computed by the author based on Asian Productivity Organization (2016: 65).
Figure 3  Per-Worker Labor Productivity Level of Major Countries, USA=100 (2011 PPP)
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‘Criticism of Catch-Up Industrialization’ is provided in chapter 6 of Suehiro 
(2014). However, in regard to a metric illustrating the differential in 
productivity of an individual country, it should be noted that the catch-up 
index remains an issue for NIES as well as for emerging Asian countries 
such as China. 
One way to reduce the differential in productivity with developed 
countries is to upgrade the country’s industrial structure by shifting the 
manufacturing sector from low-value-added industries to high-value-added 
ones, or by shifting from manufacturing to the service sector. Another way is 
to switch from an input-driven growth path to an innovation-led growth 
path. 
 
III. INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF INNOVATION AND R&D 
 
National innovation systems 
 
Innovation can be discussed at two levels: the national level and the 
corporate level. This section considers innovation at the national level.6 A 
representative work is Nelson’s National Innovation Systems: A 
Comparative Analysis (Nelson 1993). In the first chapter of this book, 
Nelson and Rosenberg assert that the systems and organizations 
established by a nation, particularly expansion of higher education and 
implementation of fit-for-purpose industrial policies, are indispensable for 
promoting innovation. Similarly, Freeman, who has conducted research on 
Japan’s technological development, developed solid arguments in his article 
‘The “National System of Innovation” in Historical Perspective’ (Freeman 
1995). 
Freeman asserted that the prospect of a country achieving innovation 
was defined not only by government policy but by strong systemic and 
organizational factors as well, including corporate organizations and 
industrial organizations. Therefore, he focused on Germany’s introduction 
of a technical education system in the past (in contrast to what was done in 
the UK) and Japanese manufacturers’ policy of focusing on the workplace 
(in contrast to what was done in the US). 
Furthermore, after comparing Japan with the former Soviet Union in 
6For innovative works at the corporate level, please see chapter 4 in Suehiro 2014. 
14 
 
                                                   
the 1970s, and East Asia with Latin America, Freeman used South Korea 
and Brazil as case studies to explain how differences in national systems of 
innovation impact economic performance. 
A particularly salient feature of Freeman’s thesis is the regional 
comparison he makes between East Asia and Latin America. This is because 
he uses some unique metrics to explain why Asian NICs (later Asian NIES) 
have experienced more economic success than Latin American NICs (13). 
He used the following seven unique metrics: (1) the spread of higher 
education and the proportion of engineering students amongst university 
students; (2) differences in whether the import of technology led to domestic 
technological changes and R&D; (3) the proportion of industry R&D in total 
R&D expenditures; (4) the extent of infrastructure for developing science 
and technology; (5) the relative importance of foreign direct investment and 
the level of implementing Japanese management models; (6) the size of 
investment in telecommunications infrastructure; and (7) the share of 
electronics industries as compared to all industries. Asian NICs 
outperformed Latin American NICs on all seven metrics. 
These intentionally chosen metrics clearly highlight the focus of 
Freeman’s thesis on the manufacturing sector and production sites, with a 
pronounced concentration on the telecommunications and electronics 
industries. Such arguments were directly linked to the strong interest in 
Japanese-style production systems (such as the Toyota production method) 
as US manufacturing declined and Japanese manufacturers made rapid 
progress in the late 1980s.7 
However, Japan headed into a long recession with the bursting of the 
bubble economy. Interest in Japanese production systems swiftly waned, 
and arguments about ‘national innovation systems’ referencing Japan’s 
success also disappeared. Replacing this were ‘cluster theory’, advocated by 
Michael Porter of the Harvard Business School, which focused on 
geographic concentrations of manufacturers, service industries, and R&D 
institutions in designated regions and their interconnectedness (Porter 
1998), and the World Bank’s Innovative East Asia: The Future of Growth 
(Yusuf 2003). 
The previous discussions that focused on the lead role of government, 
improvements in manufacturers’ production technologies, and education 
7For the Japanese production system, please see Suehiro 2008, chap. 10. 
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and training at production sites receded, and arguments favouring 
collaboration between the government and the private sector, tie-ups 
between the manufacturing and nonmanufacturing (finance and services) 
sectors, and the building of flexible corporate networks including 
universities and accounting firms came to the fore. 
 
International comparison of R&D expenditure and R&D personnel 
 
Let us return to our discussion of innovation at the national level. Such 
metrics as the ratio of R&D expenditure to nominal GDP, per capita R&D 
expenditure, population density of R&D personnel, the number of patent 
applications and acceptances, and the number of scientific articles 
published in international peer-reviewed journals assess whether a 
particular country is actively innovating. 
Table 2 highlights the results of the first two of the above-mentioned 
metrics using data from information on the UNESCO STAT. As the table 
illustrates, compared with European countries (apart from Sweden), Japan 
and Asian NIES have a higher ratio of R&D expenditure relative to GDP. 
However, European countries have a slightly higher per capita R&D 
expenditure metric. 
Nevertheless, what is most interesting is the extremely wide gap 
between the Asian NIES and ASEAN countries. One indicator of whether a 
country is science and technology focused is whether its ratio of R&D 
expenditure to GDP is more than 2%. As shown in the latest year (2014), 
Malaysia had 1.26%, Thailand had 0.48%, and Indonesia was less than 0.1%. 
This puts them a long way from transitioning to a high-income country. 
While Latin American countries’ metrics are slightly higher than those of 
ASEAN countries, they are still much lower than the Asian NIES. 
Another feature common to ASEAN countries is the lack of notable 
improvement in performance between 2000 and 2014. Upgrading science 
and technology education and pursuing R&D should have been important 
national targets for both Malaysia and Thailand during those 15 years. 
Nevertheless, no results are evident in the two countries in general, and in 
Thailand in particular. There is a striking contrast in this regard when 
compared to China’s performance, which is aiming to be a ‘leading nation in 
science and technology’. 
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China’s technology promotion policy was provided in the ‘Guidelines on 
the National Medium-Term and Long-Term Program for Science and 
Technology Development (2006–2020)’, announced in 2006 (Science Portal 
China 2016). The key words in these guidelines are ‘indigenous innovation, 
leapfrogging in priority fields, enabling development, and leading the 
future’. ‘Indigenous innovation’ is not borrowed technology but refers to the 
‘national innovation capability’ to develop domestic new technologies (Table 
3).8 
 
8 According to Kato (2016), ‘development of indigenous technology’ does not exactly 
mean the creation of fully self-reliant technology. Conversely, the majority of 
technology in China is borrowed from abroad and is improved to adjust to local mass 
markets. Therefore, technology formation in China shows a typical case of an informal 
system of Chinese capitalism. Likewise, Marukawa (2013) also insisted that Chinese 
technological development is not the ‘catch-up’ type but rather the ‘catch-down’ type in 
the sense that they downgrade both the level of production technology and the quality 
of products to meet local market needs. See also Sato 2014. 
2000 2010 2014 2000 2010 2014
Japan 3.00 3.25 3.58 786 1,104 1,309
Korea 2.18 3.46 4.29 401 1,063 1,485
Taiwan 1.90 2.80 3.00 419 1,080 1,389
Singapore 1.82 2.01 2.18 767 1,420 1,797
China 0.89 1.72 2.04 26 159 269
Malaysia 0.46 1.03 1.26 60 214 324
Thailand 0.24 0.23 0.48 18 29 76
Indonesia 0.06 0.08 0.08 3.1 6.5 8.5
India 0.74 0.79 0.82 15 35 39
Brazil 0.99 1.15 1.23 90 164 194
Chile …. 0.33 0.37 …. 60 85
Mexico 0.31 0.45 0.53 33 66 92
Sweden 3.42 3.21 3.16 930 1,341 1,426
USA 2.62 2.74 2.72 953 1,323 1,441
France 2.08 2.17 2.25 555 806 905
Germany 2.39 2.71 2.86 640 1,093 1,318
Note: R&D expenditures per capita include both public sector and private sector. 
R&D expenditure against GDP （%) R&D expenditure per capita ($）
Table 2　Expenditure of R&D in Major Countries including Emerging Asia: 2000, 2010 and 2014
Countries/
Economies
Sources: (1) GDP (%): http://www.globanote.jp/p-data-g/?dno=1190&post_no=10315; (2) Per capita
(persons): http://www.globanote.jp/p-data-g/?dno=2580&post_no=10315. Original data are extracted
from UNESCO STAT.
17 
 
                                                   
 
At the same time, the government established four major national 
targets in science and technology: (1) the ratio of R&D expenditure to GDP 
will reach 2.5% by 2020; (2) the contribution of technological progress to 
GDP growth or total factor productivity will account for 60% and over; (3) 
the cost of importing foreign technology against the total cost of developing 
new technology will account for less than 30%; and (4) China will be ranked 
Code
1
2
3
4
1 The ratio of R&D expenditure against nominal GDP shall exceed 2.5% by 2020. 
2
3
4
https://www.spc.jst/go.jp/policy/science_policy/chapt3/3.01/3_1_1/3_1_1_1.html.
Source: Compiled by the author based on the documents in Science Portal China.
Retrieved on 28 November 2016 from <https://….
①Biotechnology, ②Information and technology, ③New materials industry, ④
Advanced manufacturing technology, ⑤Advanced energy industry, ⑥Maritime
technology, ⑦Lazer industry, ⑧space development industry.
①Energy (5), ②Water and Mineral resources (7), ③Environemnts (4)、④
Agriculture (9), ⑤Manufacturing (8), ⑥Transportation (6), ⑦Information and
modern service industry (7), ⑧Medical and healthcare services (5), ⑨Urban
development (5), ⑩Public safety industry (6), ⑪Defense industry (6, but not
identified).
(4) New Advanced Technolories to be Promoted: 8 Fields
Table 3  National Science and Technology Development Plan (2006-2020) in China
自主創新 Self-reliance innovation. Enhancement of state capacity of innovation;
combination of local technology with foreign one.
重点飛躍 Realize leaving development by adapting core and advanced
technoloies to state economy, people's life and national security.
発展支援 Support a sustainable development by developing basic technologies as
well as versatile-type technologies on the basis of current needs.
未来牽引 Creating new market needs, the new type of industries and the future
economic society by diffusing basic research and advanced technology.
The contribution of science and technology to the GDP growth, or more exactly
speaking, total factor productivity (TFP) is computed as 60% and over.
Ranking the Top Five Countiries in the World in the fields of patents and
scientific academic papers (citation)
Item
(3) Key Sectors to be Promoted: 11 Sectors and 68 Items
(2) National Targets of the Plan
(1) Guidance by the State: Four Major Slogans
The dependency ratio of foreign technology (cost of introducing foregn
technology/(R&D expenditure for domestic technology + cost of introducing
foreign technology) is less than 30%.
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in the top five in terms of the number of patents and scientific articles in 
peer-refereed international journals. In brief, the Chinese government’s 
stance completely focused on a traditional approach to innovation or the 
creation of a national system of innovation. 
On the other hand, the reference to ‘leading the future’ in the guidelines 
indicates the government’s vision to enable basic research and create new 
industries from a long-term perspective. New industries or new advanced 
technologies designated by the government fell into eight fields: 
biotechnology, information and technology, new materials, advanced 
manufacturing technologies, advanced energy, maritime technology, laser 
technology, and space development. These industries are assumed to 
develop under the dominant role of government-owned corporations. The 
government therefore is expected to make a more direct contribution rather 
than an indirect contribution to innovation. Such a view, as mentioned 
above, is quite different from that in Porter (1998), Yusuf and Evenett 
(2002), and Yusuf (2003).  
Propelled by this technology promotion policy, China’s ratio of R&D 
expenditure to GDP successfully exceeded the national target of 2.0% in 
2014.9 Therefore, even though both China and Thailand occasionally both 
became upper-middle-income countries in 2010, China seemed to gain an 
advantage with regard to advancing to become a high-income country. On 
the other hand, the absence of fundamental structural reforms will make 
China risk being caught in the middle-income trap in the near future (World 
Bank and Development Research Center of the State Council 2012; Kan 
Siyu 2013).  
In the next part, three countries—China, Malaysia, and Thailand—are 
examined in relation to their patterns of experience in avoiding the 
middle-income trap. According to the survey research of Veerayooth (2015), 
the patterns of avoiding the middle-income trap are classified into three 
major groups: (A) establishing appropriate education and institutions; (B) 
changing export composition through comparative advantage; and (C) 
promoting industrial upgrading through state intervention.  
Differences in the three groups are affected by the different roles played 
by governments in instituting innovative measures. Group C is 
9The figure of 2.0% is an important criterion when we judge whether a certain country 
belongs to an innovation-oriented state. 
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characterized by the most active role of government in innovation and 
industrial upgrading, while group A is characterized by a minimal state role 
in industrial promotion; rather, the state is expected to facilitate such 
infrastructure as an educational system for the sake of promoting 
innovation. Group B maintains a position between group A and group C, 
where both private firms’ efforts (supply side) and the condition of the world 
market (demand side) are more important than government policies of 
promoting exportable products. A shift to higher-value-added exports is 
realized through market mechanisms rather than state intervention 
(Veerayooth 2015: 56–57).  
In this paper, China is supposed to represent group C, while Malaysia 
and Thailand belong to group B. It is true that the governments of Malaysia 
and Thailand have constantly intended to play significant roles in both 
industrial upgrading and changes in export composition. But new industries 
and new products have eventually been introduced by foreign firms in 
general, and by multinational firms in particular. Government roles are 
limited as compared to the case of China. In addition, local private firms 
seem to have discovered their competitive advantages in resource-based 
industries and the service sector rather than core manufacturing industries. 
They also seem to have focused on niche products and niche markets rather 
than new products and new production technology (Khoo, Tsunekawa, and 
Kawano 2017).  
Comparing two countries in particular reference to the role of 
government in formulating national economic plans, Malaysia seems to 
follow the pattern of group C because the government is empowered to 
supervise the private sector. Likewise, the Thai government is also given 
the power to support targeted industries through tax incentives and 
semigovernment institutions (sathaban). However, its actual contribution is 
very limited.10 In this sense, it is safe to say that Thailand belongs to group 
A. Keeping these characteristics in mind, let me examine the experience of 
each country in reference to its effort of avoiding or overcoming the 
middle-income trap. 
10 For the active role of Thai government in industrial upgrading, see Intarakumnerd 
(2010) and Suehiro (2010). Intarakumnerd (2017) introduces the case studies of the 
hard disk drive, the automobile, and food processing in reference to the public-private 
partnership and the role of semigovernment agencies such as the Thai Automotive 
Institute.  
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IV. THE RESPONSE OF THREE COUNTRIES: CHINA, MALAYSIA, AND 
THAILAND 
 
China: Growing beyond the low-cost advantage 
 
Growing Beyond the Low-Cost Advantage: How the People’s Republic 
of China Can Avoid the Middle-Income Trap by the Asian Development 
Bank (in cooperation with the National School of Development, Peking 
University), 11  which was introduced at the beginning of this chapter, 
stated the following (ADB 2012b, 3). 
 
International experiences show that, in many countries, growth 
slowed significantly after they attained middle-income status. They 
find they were caught in what is increasingly known as the 
‘middle-income trap’. On one hand, they could no longer compete 
with low-income countries because of rising wages. On the other, 
they were unable to compete with high-income countries because 
they have not shifted into higher-value production through 
innovation and industrial upgrading. 
 
So what are the issues China faces in transitioning into a high-income 
country? Table 4 summarizes the points highlighted in the Asian 
Development Bank’s report. 
The Asian Development Bank listed seven risks and problems for 
China: (1) large productivity gaps as compared to advanced countries (see 
also Figure 3 in this paper); (2) labour market changes and the rapid rise in 
wages (see Figure 1 in this paper); (3) a growth pattern that relies 
excessively on public investment (high saving) and exports; (4) widening 
domestic income inequality; (5) exploitation of natural resources and 
environmental degradation; (6) an international backlash against the rapid 
growth in China’s presence in the world economy; and (7) the weakness of 
institutions in supporting long-term growth. These almost duplicate the 
items listed in the World Bank’s China 2030 report (World Bank and DRC 
11 This ADB report was actually written by Juzhong Zhuang, Paul Vanderberg, and 
Yiping Huang. 
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2012). 
 
 
 
The measure that is stressed the most in the report is productivity 
improvement through innovation and upgrading of the industrial structure. 
The report also proposes the adoption of three strategies: (1) inclusive 
growth to reduce income inequality; (2) a shift from a growth path that has 
relied too much on investment and exports of industrial goods to one based 
on increasing domestic demand and developing the service sector;12 and (3) 
environmentally friendly growth (green growth) that both conserves 
resources and protects the environment. 
12 Computing the percentage of contribution by important activities to GDP growth 
rate between 2009 and 2011 (just after the worldwide financial crisis), we see that the 
largest contribution in China is gross capital formation or investment (48%), followed 
by final consumption at household (35%) and exports (28%). By contrast, in the United 
States, the largest contribution is final consumption at household (71%), followed by 
government consumption (18%) and investment (15%). International financial 
instituions such as the IMF, therefore, insisted that China rebalance its growth 
pattern (Suehiro 2014, 211–216).  
Fields Risks and Problems New Direction for Long-term Growth
Productivity Large technology and productivity gaps withadvanced countries
Labor markets and
wages
Rapid rise of wages. PRC is approaching the
so-called "Lewis turning point"
Sources of growth Growth has relied too much on investment(high saving) and net exports
Shift of the sources of growth from over-
investment and exports to domestic
consumption; development of service
industries
Income inequality
Rising income inequality: Gini coefficient
increased from 30 in the early 1980s to 43.4
in 2008
Reducing income inequality to make growth
more inclusive; enhancing governance
Pressures on
natural resources
Rapid growth has created pressure on its
natural resources and the environment
(water shortage, pollution).
Promoting green growth to conserve
resources and protect the environment
External economic
environment
As the World's second largest economy,
impact of the PRC becomes significant
Strengthening international and regional
economic cooperation
General Weakness in governance and institutions tosupport the long-term growth
Deepening structural reforms: reforms of
enterprises, labor and land markets, the
financial sector, and the fiscal system
PRC growth needs to be driven increasingly
by productivity improvements through
innovation and industrial upgrading.
Table 4  The Middle-Income Trap Facing Contemporary China and the ADB Policy Options, 2012
Source: Summarized by the author based on information from ADB (2012).
22 
 
                                                   
Still, these economic challenges are very broad and lacking in detail, 
although China has started the state-led policy of developing science and 
technology on the basis of self-reliance innovation as summarized in Table 3. 
Among the seven policy issues in Table 4, the most important one is 
probably structural reform. However, structural reform is a problem that 
lies at the root of the socialist system.13 The implementation of a ‘reform 
and open’ path provides the dream and incentives for economic growth 
shared by both corporations and Chinese citizens, but the pain that 
accompanies structural reform creates conflicts of interest for related 
parties. Considering such difficulties, China’s path of transition to a 
high-income country is not necessarily going smoothly.  
 
Malaysia: From ‘new economic policies’ to a ‘new economic model’ 
 
The Malaysian economy is currently in crisis. Under the Mahathir 
administration, the economy achieved a certain degree of success, with 
growth in production and exports of industrial goods, mainly from the 
electric appliance and electronics sector, as well as rectification of 
inequalities between ethnic groups under policies favouring ethnic Malays 
(the Bumiputra Policy; Torii 2006). However, there has clearly been an 
economic slowdown since the 2000s (see also Table 1). 
Let’s compare the growth rates of two periods on either side of the 1997 
Asian currency crisis: the 10 years from 1987 to 1996 and the 10 years from 
2000 to 2009. In the 10 years before the Asian currency crisis, the annual 
growth rate for Malaysia’s manufacturing sector was 13.9%, which was 
higher than that of China (12.6%), Thailand (11.8%), and Vietnam (6.6%).  
However, in the decade starting in 2000, Malaysia’s growth rate 
plummeted to 3.7%, which was lower than that of China (10.8%), Vietnam 
(10.5%), and Thailand (5.6%). The same is true for the annual growth rate of 
exports. Malaysia’s annual rate of export growth was 11% from 2000 to 2009. 
This was not only below that of booming China (23%) and Vietnam (21%), 
but also below that of Thailand (14%). 
Yusuf and Nabeshima attribute this economic stagnation to the bias of 
export products towards electric and electronic goods. While the makeup of 
13A similar idea is shared among Kan Siyu (2013), Peerenboom (2014), and Kato and 
Kajitani (eds.) (2016). 
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Malaysia’s exports was similar to that of other Asian countries (and 
competition with China was severe), little progress was made towards 
diversification, there was no shift towards high-value-added export products, 
and training of personnel to develop new technologies and new products did 
not take place (Yusuf and Nabeshima 2009, chap. 2 and 3).  
The electric and electronics sectors, which drove the Malaysian economy, 
grew into a large industry accounting for more than 70% of manufactured 
exports and more than 50% of total exports at the end of the 1990s. However, 
after Seagate (the largest manufacturer and exporter of hard disk drives in 
the world) closed its plant in 2000, Intel, Motorola, and Dell all either 
shrunk their operations or closed their plants in 2001, shifting their 
production bases to China (Yusuf 2003, 294). In 2002, Malaysia ceded to 
China its title as the number one exporter of PCs to the US market. 
The most serious issue for Malaysia was the high proportion of foreign 
workers (mostly workers coming from Indonesia, followed by those from 
Bangladesh and Nepal) in the manufacturing sector. The percentage of 
foreign workers, which accounted for a mere 2% in 1990, rose to 10% in 1995, 
to 21% in 2004, and surpassed 28% in 2008 (see Figure 4). Migrant foreign 
workers are thought to have hardly contributed to the improvement of 
labour productivity and innovative works. This is because they have no 
incentives due to their short-term employment contracts and their unstable 
working status. As a result, the Malaysian government froze new 
employment of foreign workers in 2009, when the number of foreign 
workers totalled 2.3 million, and set a policy to reduce it to 1.5 million by 
2015 (Tham and Loke 2011).  
Nevertheless, the number of foreign migrant workers in unskilled fields 
remains at a very high level. According to the latest survey of the 
International Labour Organization (ILO), the ratio of migrant employment 
to total manufacturing employment was 37% in 2009, and 34% even in 2014. 
Likewise, the ratio of migrant employment to total construction 
employment remained 30% and 34% in the corresponding years (ILO 2016, 
2).14 
14To tackle this problem, the Eleventh Malaysia Plan (2016–2020) has stated that a 
comprehensive immigration policy for foreign workers will be developed, with the 
Ministry of Human Resources (MOHR) assuming the lead role in policy making. At the 
same time, the Institute of Labour Market Information and Analysis (ILMIA) has also 
been established under MOHR to carry out labour market studies, including 
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To deal with this situation, the Najib administration announced its New 
Economic Model (NEM) in March 2010 following the expiry of the National 
Development Plan (NDP, 1991 to 2010), which in turn had succeeded the 
New Economic Policy (NEP), which was aimed at correcting the economic 
inequalities between ethnic groups. At the same time, the government 
embarked on the Economic Transformation Programme (ETP), which aims 
at escaping from the middle-income trap (Nukaya 2012). 
Table 5 compares the NEM with the NDP implemented during the 
Mahathir and Abdullah administrations. The NEM under the Abdullah 
administration consists of seven strategies. It is a radical transformation 
that involves a shift (1) from an investment-driven growth path to a 
productivity-focused growth path; (2) from being government driven to 
private sector led; (3) from centralization to local autonomy; (4) from a focus 
on balanced regional growth to the creation of strategic clusters; (5) from 
favouring specific industries and companies (steel, cement, automobiles, 
etc.) to favouring technologically capable industries and companies; (6) from 
an export focus on the G3 market (Europe, US, and Japan) to a focus on 
markets within Asia; and (7) from relying on foreign workers to selectively 
estimating labour supply and demand from 2015 to 2030 (Othman and Rahim 2014) . 
Source: Tham, Siew-Yean and Wai Heng Loke (2011). "Industrial Deepening in
Malaysia: Lessons for Developing Countries," Asian Development Review, 28 (2), p.102.
Figure 4  Migrant Workers in the Malaysian Manufacturing Sector, 1981-2010 (%)
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appointing foreign specialists and attracting skilled professionals from 
overseas. 
 
 
Among the aforementioned policies, (1), the productivity-focused growth 
path, is the same as the policy proposals made by international institutions 
in relation to China. In other words, the aim is to revise the input-driven 
growth path. Meanwhile, items (2) to (5) aim at correcting the distortions in 
resource allocation resulting from the Bumiputra Policy (in the NEP and 
NDP) so that the economic structure is in tune with the era of globalization.  
However, there is strong resistance to revising the Bumiputra Policy, 
even from within the ruling party. In addition, the percentages of R&D 
expenditures against nominal GDP are stagnant—1.03% in 2010 and 1.26% 
in 2014, lower than those of China (1.72% and 2.04% respectively). As 
Kawano (2017) introduces in excellent examples of local private firms’ 
activities in the natural rubber industry, Malaysia begins to promote 
notable innovation in resource-based industries. However, carefully 
examining these case studies, we recognize that local private firms (Top 
National Plan National Development Plan (NDP) New Economic Model (NEM)
Period From 1991 to 2010 From 2010 to 2020
Governments Mahathir bin Mohamad; Abdullah binHaji Ahmad Badawi Haji Mohd Najib
Growth strategy Growth through capital accumulation Growth through productivity
Public/private Dominant state participation in theeconomy Private sector led growth
Policy installment Centralized strategic planning in thedecision-making process
Localized autonomy in decision-
making process
Local development Balanced regional growth Cluster and corridor-based economicactivities
Industrial policy Favor specific industries and firms Favor technologically capapbleindustries and firms
Export promotion Export dependence on G-3 markets(US, Europe and Japan)
Asian (including ASEAN) and Middle
East orientation
Human resources
development
Restriction on foreign skilled workers,
increasing unskilled foreign workers
Retain and attract skilled
professionals, including return of
overseas brains
Table 5　Two National Development Plans in Malaysia: NDP and NEM
Source: Compiled by the author based on information from Malaysia National Economic Advisory
Council (NEAC) (2010).
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Glove and Kossan) have mainly developed niche products, such as medical 
surgical gloves, with the improvement of imported technology rather than 
new products with new production technology.  
In core manufacturing industries such as the automotive industry, the 
government has not been successful in inviting new multinational 
corporations into Malaysia after the Asian currency crisis. Reviewing these 
elements, Malaysia is likely to face a much harder path of transition into a 
high-income country than China (Nukaya 2012; Onozawa 2014). 
 
Thailand: Pursuing new age industries and ‘Thai-ness’ 
 
Last is the case of Thailand. National Economic and Social Development 
Board Secretary General Arkhom stated the following about the direction of 
the Thai economy, taking into consideration the 11th National Economic 
and Social Development Plan that was inaugurated in October 2011 
(Arkhom 2011).15 His idea is summarized as in the following.  
‘When comparative advantage was being discussed from the 1960s to 
the 1980s, a factor and resource input growth strategy was not only 
mainstream, but it also worked. Once the era of competitive advantage 
began, the policy shifted to efficiency and productivity-led growth strategy. 
In the 2010s, the policy needs to shift to an innovation- and creative-led 
growth strategy. 
So far, this does not differ much from what has already been said by 
international institutions. What is unique about it is the substance of the 
‘creative economy’ (setthakit sarngsan) needed for this to be achieved. 
Secretary General Arkhom referred to four examples of creative economy: 
(1) industries using cultural assets and natural resources (tourism, Thai 
food, spas, etc.), (2) the performing arts, (3) media (movies, music, 
animation), and (4) functionally creative industries (advertising, fashion, 
urban planning, etc.). In short, the target is shifting from 
low-cost-advantage-based manufacturing industries to service industries 
that emphasise ‘Thai-ness’. In fact, the 11th National Economic and Social 
Development Plan extolled the cultivation of knowledge-based industries 
15Arkhom was appointed Minister of Transportation under the Prayudh 
administration in 2014 to promote the mega projects including a high-speed railway 
system. 
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(the service sector; Porametee 2011). 
The approach of seeking out ‘Thai-ness’ as Thailand’s competitive 
advantage is also confirmed in the Thailand Board of Investment’s ‘New 
Investment Promotion Strategy (2013 to 2017)’ in Table 6 (Udom 2013). 
 
 
 
This New Investment Promotion Strategy was groundbreaking because 
it was the first time the Board of Investment (BOI) had left out 
labour-intensive industries (textiles and clothing, athletic footwear, etc.) 
from the list of industries to be promoted. In addition, the scheme also 
10 Industries Type of products or business
１．Basic infurastructure
and logistics
①industrial zone, ②power generation from natural gas, ③water
resourcese, ④mass transit, ⑤commercial airport, ⑥logistics
２．Basic industry ①steel, ②petrochemicals, ③pulp and paper, ④machinery etc.
３．Medical device and scien  ①medical device, ②medicine, ③medical food, ④scientific equipmentetc.
４．Alternative energy and
environmental services
①power generation from renwable energy, ②recycling, ③industrial
waste disposal service, ④energy service company （ESCO） etc.
５．Services that support
industrial sector
①R&D, ②HRD, ③engineering design, ④software, ⑤calibration, ⑥
regional headquarter, ⑦trade & investment support office etc.
６．Advance core
technologies
①biotechnology, ②nanotechnology, ③advanced material technology
etc.
７．Food and agricultural
processing industry
①processed food, ②food additive, ③herbal  extract, ④plant
propagation,     ⑤products from natural rubber, ⑥bio-fuel such as
ethanol, bio-diesel.
８．Hospitality & wellness
①tourism and sports promotion activities, ②Thai motion picture
production, ③dedecated health center, ④retirement home and care
center
９．Automotive and other
transport equipment
①cars, ②motorcycle, ③train, ④electric train, ⑤aircraft, ⑥
shipbuilding and maintenance.
１０．Electric and electrical
appliances
①electronic design, ②organics & printed electronics, ③HDD/SDD
and parts, ④solar cells, ⑤white electrical appliances.
(C) Industries that are developed from domestic resources and Thainess
(D) Industries that Thailand is competent to be global's manufacturing base
(Global Supply Chain)
Table 6  10 Industries to be Promoted in the Future of Thailand (January 2013)
Source: Compiled by the author based on Udom (2013: 16-17).
(A) Industrial foundation
(B) Advanced Core Technologies that helps elevating Thai industry 
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revised the zone-based incentives policy that prioritized investment in 
regional provinces and shifted from a system of tax incentives (exemption of 
up to seven years on corporate tax and import duties) to a policy of 
nonfinancial facilitation (such as deregulation of land ownership and 
employment of foreign specialists). This resulted in strong objections from 
industry associations of the excluded industries and regional chambers of 
commerce. 
 
Table 6 provides a summary of the New Investment Promotion Strategy. 
My focus here is to show the level of Thai-ness evident in the formulation of 
the four basic strategies and the choice of the 10 areas to be promoted. 
Industries targeted for investment promotion are wide-ranging, and I do not 
have a particular problem with this, as such is to be expected of a 
government document. 
First, as discussed in Suehiro (2014, chap. 5), 4 of the 10 industries 
being promoted—(2) basic industry, (6) advance core technologies, (9) 
automotive and other transport equipment, and (10) electronic products and 
electrical appliances—are industries in which foreign-owned companies 
have an overwhelmingly large share, so it is hard to expect much 
participation from Thai companies. 
However, Thai companies will be able to use their competitive 
advantage in four of these sectors: (1) basic infrastructure and logistics, (4) 
alternative energy and environmental services, (7) food and agricultural 
processing, and (8) hospitality and wellness. In particular, within (7), 
processed foods, herbal extracts (cosmetics), natural rubber products, and 
biofuels are products that can effectively use domestic resources, while 
within (8), tourism and sports promotion, health-care services, long-term 
accommodation for foreigners, and retirement home and care facilities were 
selected on the basis of leveraging Thailand’s national characteristic of 
hospitality. 
In May 2014, a Thai military group launched a coup d’etat to stop 
unproductive political conflict between pro- and anti-Thaksin groups that 
started in 2013. Under the Prayut Chan-ocha government, the Ministry of 
Industry rearranged the previous policies and investment targets and 
submitted a cabinet with a new idea of promoted industries (Figure 5).  
According to this new idea, industrial policies occur in two different 
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stages: the first stage encompasses the short- and mid-term plan to enhance 
the competitiveness of existing industries such as new-generation 
automobiles, medical and welfare tourism, and agriculture and 
biotechnology; and the second or new stage is the long-term plan to nurse 
future-type industries that reflect the new surging of Thailand’s economy, 
such as robotics, biochemistry, digital technology, and Thailand as a medical 
hub. On the one hand, it is very easy to understand that the first stage 
exactly follows the previous BOI’s investment plan of targeted industries as 
summarized in Table 6. On the other hand, the second stage, or the new 
surging of Thailand’s economy, is very ambitious, comparable to the 
National Science and Technology Development master plan (2006–2020) in 
China.  
 
 
 
Glancing at the Ministry of Industry’s plan, Thailand seems to aim at 
reviving the active role of the state in industrial policies as we saw before 
the 1997 Asian currency crisis. According to the classification of Veerayooth 
(2015), Thailand seems to shift its position from group A to group C.  
However, such an observation is not accurate because there is neither 
institutional support nor budgetary backup to realize its plan. It is likely 
Short and Mid-term Plan Long-term Plan
The First Stage S-shape Curve New S-shape Curve
Enhancement of existing industries'
competitiveness
Nursing the future industries to
realize the new take-off of the
Thailand economy
①New Generaltion Automotive, ②
Smart Electronics, ③Affluence,
Medical and Welfare Tourism, ④
Agriculture and Biotechnology, ⑤
Food for the Future.
⑥Robotics,⑦Avitation and Logistics,
⑧Biofuels and Biochemical, ⑨Digital
Industry, ⑩Medical Hub.
Figure 2  Industrial Policies and Clusters Strategy in Thailand (2015)
Sources: Compiled by the author based on Oizumi (2016: 4-5) and Ministry of
Industry, Thailand (2015).
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that the government will entrust the development of both existing and 
future industries to private firms, including multinational corporations. 
In my recent work examining the possibility of Thai firms 
demonstrating their advantages, I pointed out three major sectors (Suehiro 
2017): (1) oil refineries, natural gas, and petrochemicals under the control of 
the PPT group 16  (government-linked companies); (2) export-oriented 
agro-industry, including new energy industries based on biotechnology; and 
(3) service industries based on Thai-ness and Thai hospitality such as 
tourism, medical and health-care services, restaurants and fast food, 
housing, and entertainment. 
 
 
What is interesting to us is the fact that leading groups of family-owned 
business are unexceptionally involved in both agro-industry and service 
16 PTT group is the conglomerate under the management control of the former state 
enterprise of Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTT). They do not use the name of PAT 
because that PAT has already been used by the Port Authority of Thailand (PAT). 
Category Type of businesses Name of Group/ Family Business (specific company)
Beer, soft drinks TCC (Thai Beverage, Oishi), Boon Rawd Brewery (Singha)
Rice, silo, warehousing CP (CP Intertrade), Capital Rice, Asian Golden Rice
Sugar + Ethanol Mitr-Phol, Thai Roon Ruang, Kwang Soon Lee
Natural rubber Sri Trang Agro Industry, Thai Hua Rubber, Von Bundit, TeckBee Hang, Thai Rubber Latex Corporation
Broiler chickens CP (CP Foods), Betagro, Laemthong Sahakarn
Canned tuna, shrimp Thai Union Frozen Products (TUF) , CP (CP Foods)
Construction Italian-Thai Development (ITD), Ch. Karnchang
Real estates, Propert business L&H, CP (CP Land), TCC (Univentures, TCC Land)
Housing industry Pruksa Real Estate, Supalai, Quality House
Industrial estate Saha Group, Amata, Hemaraj
Convenience stores CP (CP All: 7-Eleven), Central (Familymart), Saha Group
Supermarkets, C&C CP (Siam Makro), Central (CPN), Siam Future
Department store Central (Central, Robinson),  The Mall,  TCC
Restaurants Central (CRC), MK Restaurant, Saha Group
Chains of fast food Mahakijsiri (Nesle coffee), Minor Group (Pizza Hut)
Hotel services Central (CENTEL),  CP (CP Land), Dusit Thani
Hospital, healthcare services BGH (Bangkok Dusit Medical Service), Thonburi Hospital
Cinema Major Cineplex
TV Programs BEC World, Grammy, Kantana
Source: Compiled by the author based on information from his field survey.
Shopping mall
and other service
industries
Property, housing
and industrial
estates
Agro industry
Entertainment
Table 7.  Major Family Businesses in Agro Industry and Service Sector, as of 2015
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industries, as shown in Table 7. Typical cases are the CP (Charoen 
Pokphand) Group of the Chearavanont family, the Central Group of the 
Chirathivat family, the TCC Group of the Sirivadhanabhakdhi family, the 
TUF Group of the Chansiri family, and the Saha Group of the 
Chokewattana family.  
These family-owned groups are active in developing new products and 
new production technology in agro-industry (Intarakumnerd 2017). They 
also are very active in promoting their overseas activities in ASEAN 
countries in general, and in CLMV (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and 
Vietnam) in particular. They look for new business opportunities in 
manufacturing and nonmanufacturing by constructing strategic business 
alliances with large Chinese firms (Suehiro 2017). In Thailand, the active 
player is not the government, but a private firm. Family businesses seek 
their own positioning in Asian markets regardless of support from the 
government. 
 
V.  THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN NEW CHALLENGES  
 
Computing the average annual growth rates for the three countries in the 
16 years from 2000 to 2015, China shows the best economic performance 
(9.53%), followed by Malaysia (5.08%) and Thailand (4.06%).17 As compared 
to the average figure in the world (3.79%), Thailand still maintains a better 
position. However, the increased rate of per capita GNI in Thailand between 
2010 and 2015 is merely 114% (from US$ 5,112 to US$ 5,816), lower than 
the average figure of upper-middle-income countries, 124% (US$ 6,240 to 
US$ 7,737) (Table 1).  
Malaysia suffered the lowest rate, 108% (from US$ 9,069 to US$ 9,766), 
but its absolute level of per capita GNI in 2015 is the nearest position to the 
rate of high-income countries. According to the World Bank’s definition, per 
capita GNI of high-income countries was US$ 12,736 and over in 2014. It is 
apparent that Thailand is far behind Malaysia.  
Contrary to the expectations of Porter (1998) and Yusuf and Evenett 
(2002), in emerging Asia, the role of the state was not replaced by flexible 
networking of various actors in manufacturing, services, and academic 
circles. Rather, as the case of China apparently demonstrates, the state has 
17These figures are computed from the IMF World Economic Outlook 2016 (IMF 2016). 
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continued to play its active role in promoting a national system of 
innovation, and in otherwise facilitating the institutions’ support of private 
firms’ innovation. 
Under the Thaksin administration (2001–2006), Thailand also 
formulated the National Competitiveness Plan on the basis of a partnership 
between the public and private sectors (Suehiro 2010). This ambitious plan 
is comparable to the national 10-year plan ‘Made in China 2025’ to 
transform Chinese manufacturing industries into the strongest ones in the 
world. However, a military coup d’etat took place in September 2006, ending 
not only the Thaksin government but also the active role of government in 
economic fields, including industrial policies. Since the end of 2006, 
Thailand has suffered both continuous political turmoil and economic 
stagnation. 
After the military coup d’etat in May 2015, the Prayudh government has 
successfully realized political stability throughout the whole country but 
has failed to bring about economic recovery due to the slowdown of exports, 
the sharp decline of primary commodity prices, and the limitations of 
domestic consumption. To overcome economic stagnation, the Prayudh 
government invited Somkid Jatusripitak, who had been Finance Minister 
and Deputy Prime Minister in the Thaksin administration, to become 
Deputy Prime Minister in charge of economic fields.  
Somkid attempted to introduce economic policies similar to those of the 
Thaksin era as expressed in the cluster strategy in Figure 5. However, he 
hardly seems to have been successful in reconstructing a strong partnership 
between the public sector and the private sector. Rather, private firms, 
including family-owned firms, are going to discover their own competitive 
advantage in agro-industry and the service sector rather than in core 
manufacturing industries. This direction has inevitably led Thailand to a 
slowdown of its economic growth.  
The World Bank optimistically predicted that China would transition to 
a high-income country in the mid-2020s (World Bank 2012). It is highly 
likely that Thailand’s transition to a high-income country will be later than 
China’s and even Malaysia’s. On the other hand, the direction being 
targeted by Thai private firms and their choice of sectors or fields with 
competitive advantage are much clearer than Malaysia’s.  
This fact suggests to us that Thailand is possibly seeking a different 
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path from China, namely, not becoming a high-income country with a 
relatively high economic growth rate, but instead remaining an 
upper-middle-income country with a moderate economic growth rate. The 
latter is a more realistic path for a country and puts less of a burden on the 
Thai people.  
Even though Thailand’s income level stalls at that of an 
upper-middle-income country (approximately US$ 13,000), I do not think 
this would be a wrong choice for the Thai people if Thailand can find its own 
place within Asian markets and use this to gain social stability. This is 
because the author does not see a transition to a high-income country as the 
only path available for upper-middle-income countries. 
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